




An influential suggestion from David Lewis is that we should think of
assertions in terms of how they affect the conversational score. This note
outlines a way to model conversational scores in such a way that two
assertoric effects are brought together: that to assert is to propose to add
information to the common ground, and that to assert is to undertake
commitments. Rather than being seen as rivals, they should be viewed as
complementary descriptions of our practises of making assertions.
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An influential suggestion from David Lewis is that we should think of assertions
in terms of how they affect the ‘conversational score’ (Lewis, 1979). The focus
should not be on the attitudes we express, or the norms for when to do so, but on
the changes we bring about. So, what makes a speech act a case of assertion is to
be explained in terms of its characteristic effect. This idea has been developed
in two different directions: one normative and one informational.
(A) To assert is to undertake commitments.
(B) To assert is to propose to add information to the common ground.
While (A) and (B) are not mutually exclusive, they are often seen as rivals. The
most sophisticated versions of the first direction is due to Brandom (1983, 1994,
2008) and MacFarlane (2003, 2005, 2011). For Brandom a conversational score
is a a collection of normative statuses, encapsulated in their deontic score. When
we make assertions we alter the deontic score by adding further commitments.
In this way, (A) focuses on the personal aspect of communication. Taking off in
the other direction, this account has been pioneered by Stalnaker (1978, 1998,
2002). For him a conversational score is a set of propositions mutually accepted
among the speakers, the so-called common ground. The way an assertion affects
the common ground is that, when successful, it adds further information to the
shared pool. As such, (B) focuses on the interpersonal aspect of communication.
In this note, I propose a strategy for bringing the two directions together. (A)
and (B) should not not be seen as rivals, but as complementary. The motivation
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is that both accounts can legitimately claim to capture an important aspect of
our practises of making assertions. A conversational score is a specification of
the state of the conversation at some time. On the dual effect view of assertion
that I propose, then, this specification will include both individual deontic scores
and a shared common ground.
The main part of the paper is devoted to (A), outlining a formal account
of deontic scores and how they are updated. If you think that (A) and (B)
should not be run together, you can consider the merits of this part on its own.
Following Stalnaker’s (2002) description of conversations as growing bodies of
mutually accepted propositions, I go on to define the common ground as the
set of possible worlds induced by the individual speakers’ mutual commitments.
Although (A) is given explanatory priority, this results in a way to accommodate
(B) as a natural extension of undertaking commitments and proposing that
others do the same.
‘Alexander the Great was poisoned’, Bernard says assertively. Bianca doesn’t
believe him for a second. As Bianca refuses to go along with his conspiracy
theories Bernard fails to update the common ground. Now, if we only focused
on (B) we would have missed out on an important aspect of how the overall
conversational score has changed. Bianca may not have endorsed Bernard’s
claim, but she sure is going to hold him responsible for having made it. Later
on she might bring it up. Should Bernard at some subsequent stage say that
Alexander the Great died of a broken heart, she’ll remind him that this is
incompatible with something he has already committed himself to. Bernard’s
assertion has succeeded in bringing about the characteristic effect expressed by
(A), even if he failed in his proposal that ‘Alexander the Great was poisoned’
be added to the common ground.
A central notion in this story is incompatibility. The reason I want to direct
our attention to it is that incompatibility has the relevant pragmatic import.
When two sentences are incompatible, asserting the one precludes you from
an entitlement to assert the other (Brandom, 1994, 188), (2008, 120). Once
Bernard has asserted ‘Alexander the Great was poisoned’ the option of assert-
ing ‘Alexander the Great died of a broken heart’ is off the table. In the same
way, he would be precluded from an entitlement to assert ∼ φ if he had pre-
viously asserted φ ∨ ψ and ∼ ψ. The reason conversations are affected in this
manner is that making assertions characteristically involves undertaking com-
mitments. So, to account for this part of our linguistic behaviour we need to
invoke something like (A).
To be clear, this is all deontic talk. No invisible hand grabs Bernard by the
throat preventing him from doing what he is not entitled to. As it happens,
making unentitled claims might be an annoying habit of his. A hypothetical
scorekeeper would, however, mark Bernard down as occupying an illegitimate
position. His interlocutor, Bianca, would then be entitled to sanction him should
he decide not to retract one of his previous claims. Although this is an ideali-
sation it is not misleading. Should someone blatantly disregard what they are
entitled and committed to we would eventually stop regarding them as con-
versational participants. If you bullshit enough you’ll find yourself no longer
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treated as someone who makes genuine assertions (Frankfurt, 2005).
It seems obvious enough that (A) picks out a genuine phenomenon. Now we
need to spell it out more precisely. Let’ suppose Bernard and Bianca share a
propositional language with a standard logical vocabulary and grammar. This
language constitutes the sentences they trade between themselves in terms of
commitments. We also assume that these sentences stand in various incompati-
bility relations, represented as a property in the intended model. In general, an
intended model for a language L is a function from sets of sentences to sets of
sets of sentences v : P(L) 7→ P(P(L)), such that:
• v(A) = {x | x is incompatible with A};
• If A ⊆ B and A ∈ v(C) then B ∈ v(C);
• A ∈ v({∼ φ}) iff v({φ}) ⊆ v(A); and
• A ∈ v({φ & ψ}) iff A ∈ v({φ, ψ}).
So, ‘v({‘Alexander the Great was poisoned’})’ denotes the set of sets of sentences
that together are incompatible with ‘Alexander the Great was poisoned’. The
second constraint ensures that incompatibility is a hereditary property, in the
sense that if a set of sentences is incompatible with ‘Alexander the Great was
poisoned’ so is every extension of that set. Complementing the third and fourth,
other connectives are defined through abbreviations in the usual way.
Where one commitment goes others tend to follow. Over time they start
to accumulate exponentially. The more commitments we undertake the more
expansive becomes the set of collateral commitments riding along. We can
capture an aspect of such normative inferential connections by introducing a
special entailment relation: a set of sentence A entails a set of sentences B just
in case everything incompatible with everything in B is also incompatible with
A (Brandom, 1994, 115), (2008, 121).
Entailment
A entails {φ1, . . . φn} iff v({φ1}) ∩ . . . ∩ v({φn}) ⊆ v(A).
This entailment relation is multi-conclusional, material and normative. It is
multi-conclusional because both premises and conclusions are sets of sentences.
It is material because whether or not two sets are incompatible depends on the
non-formal properties of their members. And, thirdly, it is normative because
commitments and preservation of such are deontic notions. We are entertaining
the fantasy that conversations take place in an idealised setting supervised by
an impartial scorekeeper who keeps track of the conversational score. So, com-
mitments can come about independently of a speaker’s acknowledgement. In
particular, if you are committed to A and A entails B then ipso facto you are
committed to B. What your actual commitments are is not settled by you, but
the arbitration of the scorekeeper.
We need one more ancillary resource, namely sets of worlds. For our pur-
poses a world is a maximal compatible set of sentences. As incompatibility is
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represented as a property over a set of sentences, the set of worlds in play is
relative to the shared language.
Set of worlds
W = {w ⊆ L | w /∈ v(w), and for all φ ∈ L, {φ} ∈ v(w) or w entails {φ}}.
Since we’ve defined worlds in terms of incompatibility they can be used to
represent deontic scores. That requires a little bit of elaboration. Think of a
conversation as taking place between a group of speakers s1, . . . , sn proceeding
through a series of stages t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tn. In our toy model conversations advance
from one stage to the next as speakers make assertions and retractions. Once
the conversation has entered a new stage the scorekeeper updates the deontic
scores. At every stage each speaker has a (possibly empty) set of sentences they
have committed themselves to. A deontic score for a speaker, then, is the set of
all the worlds that entail all the relevant commitments. If someone is committed
to φ, their deontic score will only include worlds that entail {φ}. If they are
committed to both φ and ψ, their deontic score will only include worlds that
entail {φ, ψ}. Deontic scores are represented by a function D from speakers and
stages to sets of worlds such that:
Deontic scores
D(s,t) = {w ∈W | for all φ s.t. s is committed to φ, w entails {φ}}.
So, the deontic score of a speaker s at a stage t is the set of worlds that entails
all the commitments s has undertaken at t. It contains the information the
scorekeeper needs in order to keep track of the speaker’s normative status. By
looking at the incompatibility relations, the scorekeeper can mark down what
moves are permissible and impermissible. Asserting φ is impermissible for any
speaker who has committed themselves to something incompatible with φ. A
single world represents the deontic score of someone who is, for every φ, either
committed to φ or committed to something incompatible with φ. In other words,
a world is an open possibility at the end of the road in a conversation.
As I am fleshing out (A), alterations of the deontic score come as a result
of closing down previously open paths. When we go on making assertions we
continuously narrow down the number of worlds in our deontic scores. The
result of updating such scores can be defined over logical form, giving us a
kind of dynamic pragmatic framework. Where ‘D(s,t)[[φ]]’ denotes the result of
updating D(s,t) with φ:
• If φ is atomic, D(s,t)[[φ]] = {w ∈ D(s,t) | w entails {φ}};
• D(s,t)[[∼ φ]] = D(s,t)\D(s,t)[[φ]];
• D(s,t)[[φ & ψ]] = D(s,t)[[φ]][[ψ]];
• D(s,t)[[φ ∨ ψ]] = D(s,t)\D(s,t)[[∼ φ]][[∼ ψ]];
• D(s,t)[[φ→ ψ]] = D(s,t)\D(s,t)[[φ]][[∼ ψ]].
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Asserting an atomic sentence φ at D(s,t) results in an updated score D(s,t′) that
contains only worlds in the old score that entail {φ}. Adding commitments
to negated sentences is set-subtraction. If s asserts ∼ φ their deontic score
is first updated with φ. All the worlds in this set is then removed from D(s,t),
resulting in the updated score D(s,t′). Sentences with conjunction, disjunction or
conditional as their main connective are all instances of functional composition.
In the case of φ & ψ, the set of worlds resulting from updating D(s,t) with φ is
used as input for the second update with ψ. The result of the second update
is the new deontic score D(s,t′). When handling φ ∨ ψ we first update D(s,t)
with ∼ φ. This is then used as input for an update with ∼ ψ. Members in the
new set of worlds is finally removed from the original deontic score to arrive at
D(s,t′). The same happens for φ→ ψ, except we use φ instead if its negation.
Let me make a brief digression. The framework I’ve outlined models deontic
score change potentials. Although it is not my pursuit here, it can be imple-
mented as a formal counterpart to Brandom’s methodological pragmatism. On
his view, the assertoric content of a sentence is to be explained in terms of a
‘mapping that associates with one social deontic score. . . the set of scores for the
conversational stage that results from the assertion’ (Brandom, 1994, 190). The
dynamic character of Brandom’s remarks has been noted previously by Nickel
(2013). He doesn’t, however, provide a clear outline for what the semantics
would look like. In fact, he argues that it’s hard to see how there could be one.
The underlying problem with Nickel’s account is that he thinks of deontic scores
(or contexts) as sets of sentences speakers have committed themselves to. Once
we do that we are unable to make local contexts readily available for updates
that require multiple steps. By moving to sets of worlds instead we overcome
this worry.
I’ve modelled deontic scores as properties of individual speakers. This differs
somewhat from Brandom or Lewis, who thinks of them as properties of conver-
sations. Despite this initial difference the normative relations between speakers
will be tracked similarly. The fundamental notion that I use to define deontic
scores is incompatibility, which was selected for its pragmatic import. On my
view, the scorekeeper signals to everyone that any speaker is precluded from an
entitlement to assert φ when φ is incompatible with their previous commitments
(that is, when D(s,t)[[φ]] = ∅). Like Brandom (1994, 178 - 80) I also think of
commitments and entitlements as underwritten by sanctions. What makes one
apt for sanctioning by other speakers is being committed to something one is
not entitled to (that is, when D(s,t) = ∅). The difference is that where I rely on
a hypothetical scorekeeper, Brandom assumes that each participant plays this
role. Both ways to keep track of normative statuses involves an idealisation. In
Brandom’s scorekeeping model he ascribes to each speaker the ability to keep
track of everyone’s normative status. I, on the other hand, indulge in the ide-
alisation that there is an impartial scorekeeper surveying the conversation. I’ve
done so mainly for the simplicity it affords. If we wanted something closer to
Brandom’s view we could keep the definition of a deontic score as above, but
relativize deontic score assignment to each speaker.
Back to Bernard and Bianca. Let’s rewind to the stage where neither have
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said anything. So we imagine both being free of any commitments, abstract-
ing away from the fact that people usually start with many. In that case their
deontic scores are the same, namely D(Bernard, t) = D(Bianca, t) = the set
of all worlds. By saying that Alexander the Great was poisoned, Bernard en-
ters the next stage with an update deontic score that excludes all worlds from
D(Bernard, t) that do not entail ‘Alexander the Great was poisoned’. This
new set of worlds represents his current open possibilities. By not endorsing his
claim, and so refusing to undertake any commitments, Bianca’s deontic score
remains the same. If we kept our attention solely on (A), however, we would
lose sight of an important interpersonal dimension of communication. We do
not merely make assertions to inform others of our own attitudes and to un-
dertake personal commitments. We also endeavour to convince others to adopt
similar attitudes and endorse our claims. A conversational score needs to in-
clude more information than a record of the speakers’ deontic scores and how
they are normatively related to one another. At this point (B) enters the story.
On Stalnaker’s (2002) version, the common ground can be thought of as a
set of mutually accepted propositions. The thing to register with this descrip-
tion is that it makes use of the non-factive attitude of acceptance. His reason
for favouring this weak attitude (rather than belief or knowledge) is that having
something in the common ground that is believed to be false presents no hin-
drance to the flow of conversation. Successful communication is not dependent
on our claims or presuppositions being true or believed to be. They only need
to be readily available assumptions mutually adopted for the purposes of dis-
cussion. This brings (A) and (B) together. By making an assertion, a speaker
simultaneously undertakes commitments and proposes to add information to
the common ground, by inviting the interlocutors to do the same.
Here’s the main idea again. Assertion is a speech act with two characteristic
effects, one described by (A) and the other by (B). First, asserting φ is a way by
which we inform our interlocutors that we accept φ and undertake commitments
to it as part of the process. Second, the same speech act is also used to make a
proposal to the interlocutors that they also accept φ and so undertake commit-
ments to φ themselves. Unless something frustrates the performance of the act,
the speaker will succeed in bringing about the first effect. If the other speakers
go along with the proposal, the second effect is brought about as well. With
this picture in mind we can think of the common ground in terms of mutual
commitments. The common ground is represented by a function C from pairs
of sets of speakers and stages to sets worlds such that:
Common ground
C(s1,...,sn,t) = {w ∈W | for all φ s.t. every si is committed to φ, w entails
{φ}}.
On this version of Lewis’ suggestion, a conversational score is modelled as a pair
〈〈D(s1,t), . . . ,D(sn,t)〉, C(s1,...,sn,t)〉, where D(s1,t), . . . ,D(sn,t) are the individual
speakers’ deontic scores and C(s1,...,sn,t) their common ground. By asserting
‘Alexander the Great was poisoned’ Bernard undertakes commitments, and his
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deontic score gets updated. He simultaneously suggests to Bianca that she
does so as well. She doesn’t. As a result Bernard fails to update the common
ground with ‘Alexander the Great was poisoned’. Now it’s Bianca’s turn. She
says that Alexander the Great exhibited symptoms of typhoid fever. Naturally,
she undertakes commitments to her claim and a proposal is made to Bernard.
He recognises that it is not incompatible with his current commitments, and
after some brief reflection he accepts it. At the subsequent stage, then, both
deontic scores have been updated by removing all the worlds that do not entail
{‘Alexander the Great exhibited symptoms of typhoid fever’}. As the common
ground is a function of the individual commitments, Bianca will have succeeded
in altering their common ground as well. If either (A) or (B) were neglected we
would have missed out on a central ingredient of what it is to assert something.
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